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1 Introduction
There is a long-standing yet unsettled debate on the effect of intellectual property (IP) rights,
in particular in form of patents, on innovation and economic development (Nordhaus, 1969;
Helpman, 1993; Grossman and Lai, 2004). One strand of this debate focuses on the impact
of patents on innovation in high-tech industries, mostly in advanced economies (Scherer and
Weisburst, 1995; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004), whereas another
analyzes the role that patents can play for economic development in emerging and developing
economies (Penrose, 1973; Chen and Puttitanum, 2005; Hu and Jefferson, 2009).
Our study relates to both of these strands by providing empirical evidence for the effect of
various changes in the Indian patent law which affected patent eligibility of software. In In-
dia, software per se is explicitly excluded from patentable subject matter. In December 2004,
however, the Indian government announced an ordinance that aimed to substantially loosen the
restrictions on the patent eligibility of software. The proposed ordinance was unexpectedly
rejected by parliament in April 2005, with the result that the original restrictions remained in
place. Since neither of these events were anticipated we can treat them as natural experiments
and hereby provide a causal link between patentability and the economic value of patents, mea-
sured as ‘abnormal’ stock market returns for the affected software companies.
Our findings show that the announcement of a loosening of the restrictions on patentability,
on average, resulted in significant positive stock market returns for affected companies. When
parliament rejected the proposed change four months later, we observe again, on average, pos-
itive returns. This counter-intuitive result is explained by substantial heterogeneity in these
effects. When the ordinance was announced in 2004, positive returns for a subset of companies
dominated. When the ordinance was rejected in 2005, those companies that had seen negative
returns in 2004 experienced positive returns that outweighed the drop in returns for the subset
of companies that had experienced positive returns in 2004. This reversal of fortunes suggests
that the stock market expected some software companies to capitalize on an improved ability
to protect software inventions through patents. In fact, when the Indian intellectual property
office reinforced the restrictions on the patentability of software later in 2005, those companies
experienced again substantial stock market losses.
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature on innovation by offering empirical evi-
dence on the impact of changes in the availability and strength of patent protection on companies
in a developing economy. Most of the existing literature on IP in developing markets focuses
either on pharmaceutical patents (Arora et al., 2009; Sampat, 2010; Arora et al., 2011; Kyle
and Qian, 2013) or relies on cross-country analysis (Lerner, 2002; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003;
Qian, 2007; Hu and Png, 2013). Our study provides evidence on the effect of patents on pri-
vate returns in a highly-innovative industry that has contributed enormously to India’s recent
economic growth.1
2 Software Patents in India
A 2002 amendment to India’s 1970 Patents Act excluded software from patent eligibility. Ac-
cording to this amendment, inventions in the form of “a mathematical or business method or a
computer programme per se or algorithms” (Section 3(k) amended Patents Act) are not patent
eligible. This meant that software on its own cannot be patented, although software in combi-
nation with hardware may be patentable.
1Software accounts for around 12-16% (depending on industry definition) of total Indian exports (2010/11) and
employs around 2.5 million mostly skilled workers (UNCTAD, 2012).
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In December 2004 the Indian government issued an ordinance which stated that the clause
governing software patentability added in 2002 should be modified to exclude “a computer pro-
gramme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware”
[emphasis added]. Hence, it explicitly opened the possibility for software to be patent eligible
provided it had technical application. The proposed amendments would have had a major im-
pact on the granting practice of software patents. However, parliament unexpectedly rejected
this modification and the amendment adopted in April 2005 did not include the software-related
amendment put forward in the ordinance. This creates a window of just over 4 months during
which it was expected that software would become patent eligible.
As a consequence of the rejection of the ordinance, ambiguity persisted in the granting prac-
tice of the Indian patent office (IPO) until June 2005 when the granting practice with regard to
software patents was clarified in a set of guidelines.2 The chronology of all the events described
is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Chronology of patentability of software de jure and de facto
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Notes: Red color indicates softening of restrictions on software patentability. Black color indicates a tightening of restrictions on
software patentability.
3 Data
To analyze the effects of changes in the availability of patent protection on software in India,
we construct a firm-level dataset by matching domestic and USPTO patent filings (see online
Appendix A) of all 294 publicly traded software companies registered in India to data on these
firms from the PROWESS database (Center for Monitoring of the Indian Economy) for the
period 2000-2007.
4 Results
4.1 Patent Filings
Figure 2 shows total patent filings of publicly traded software companies in India by quarter over
the entire 2000-2007 period.3 The graph shows that the absolute number of filings by Indian
2The IPO established that “claims relating to software program product [sic] are nothing but computer program
per se simply expressed on a computer readable storage medium and as such are not allowable” (Manual of Patent
Practice and Procedure 2005, Annexure II 7.3).
3Although there is no official definition of software patents, we manually check all patent filings to ensure they
cover software inventions
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software companies at both the Indian and the U.S. patent offices is very modest. That said, a
total of 217 patent filings with the IPO and an overall share of 9% of patenting companies among
all listed software companies is still substantial, keeping in mind that software in principle
remained unpatentable throughout the period studied.
Figure 2: Total patent filings – IPO vs USPTO, 2000-2007
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While Figure 2 indicates that despite the restrictions placed on patentability software com-
panies have been filing software-related patent applications, Figure A-2 in the online appendix
indicates that very few of these filings with the IPO were granted: only 14.5%. Perhaps even
more revealing, the only patent applications officially rejected by the IPO are applications filed
immediately after the announcement of the 2004 ordinance. For comparison, until the end of
2004 all filings at the USPTO were granted.4 The substantially larger grant rate at the USPTO
underscores the restrictive approach adopted by the IPO and shows that despite a relatively large
number of software patent filings at the IPO, hardly any software patents were granted. This
suggests that the Ordinance would have had an important impact on patent granting practices.
4.2 Event Study
Next, we analyze stock market reactions to the (proposed) policy changes for the entire set
of software companies in our data: if including software in patentable subject matter is pri-
vately beneficial to firms, we would expect the softening (tightening) of restrictions on software
patentability to have a positive (negative) effect on firm valuation. Figure 3 provides a graphi-
cal representation of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) computed over the 11-day event
window adopting the Constant Mean Return Model.5 In all graphs we indicate statistically
significant (insignificant) average CAR across all listed software firms in India with a filled
(hollow) marker, adopting a 5% significance level.
4See Figure A-3 in the online Appendix. Note also that software patents continued to be patent-eligible in the
U.S. throughout our period of analysis.
5See online appendix B for more details on the approach.
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Average Effects: Counter-intuitively, the ordinance broadening patentability in late Decem-
ber 2004 as well as its undoing in April 2005 are both shown to have had a positive impact,
while the second event in 2005, the publication of the draft Manual of Patent Practice and Pro-
cedure with detailed guidelines to clarify the stance of the IPO represents a substantial negative
shock. The estimates presented in Table 1 suggest that the broadening of the ordinance results
in an average CAR of around 14%, while its undoing led to a 10% average excess return. The
drop in returns following the publication of the draft guidelines in June 2005 was of similar
magnitude.
Heterogenous Effects: However, these averages are somewhat misleading and additional
investigation reveals a more intricate yet consistent pattern across events: although the ordinance
in 2004 and its undoing in April 2005 both had an average positive effect, this average in each
case was driven by different firms. In contrast, the positive reaction to the ordinance in 2004 and
and the drop in average CAR in June 2005 were driven by the same firms.
In order to illustrate this matter empirically we plot firm-specific CAR at time t+5 following
each event in Figure 4:6 in the upper panel we observe that many firms with high CAR in 2004
saw this measure drop in April 2005 (blue downward arrows) and that the average positive
CAR – indicated by the dashed horizontal line – is driven by other firms with low CAR for
the December 2004 event (red upward arrows). From this we conclude that the identity of the
firms which drove the average positive CAR in either time period differed. Turning to the lower
panel of the same Figure, we observe a multitude of long blue arrows: firms with high CAR
following the broadening of patentability in 2004 saw their CAR drop to zero or negative values
when the June 2005 guidelines firmly shut the door on software patentability. This significant
drop is driving the average negative CAR in the sample – indicated by the dashed horizontal line
– whereas firms with comparatively low or negative CAR in 2004 (red arrows) now represent
only a limited positive counterweight. We conclude for the lower panel that the average CAR in
both periods was primarily driven by the same firms, namely those which were deemed by the
market to benefit from a broadening of patentability.
To explore the heterogeneity further, we use a difference-in-differences approach where we
distinguish between firms that had at least one patent before the first policy change (ordinance)
and those that did not. We find that the market reacted positively to the ordinance in 2004 for
patenting firms (see online appendix Table A-1), consistent with the idea that these firms were
expected to patent more in the future (an intensive margin effect) and increase in value. We see
a negative effect for patenting firms as a result of the undoing of the ordinance, which is also
consistent with this argument.
Next, given that we have detected differential groups within our sample, we ask whether
specific observable company characteristics can explain the substantial heterogeneity across
firms associated with the policy changes illustrated in Figure 4. As dependent variable we
construct a dummy variable Idrop equal to unity (a) if the firm-specific CAR at t+ 5 following
the April 2005 undoing of the ordinance is smaller than that t + 5 following the December
2004 event, and (b) if the firm-specific CAR at t + 5 for the June 2005 revised guidelines is
smaller than its equivalent for the December 2004 ordinance broadening patentability — in
terms of the plots in Figure 4 we are trying to predict the blue arrows. An alternative dependent
variable ‘∆CAR’ measures the magnitude of change in CAR (in either case 2005 less 2004
event), whereby a large positive (negative) value suggests a significant rise (drop) in relative
CAR between the two events.
As firm-level characteristics, we use data on sales, firm age, share of services in total sales
6In both panels ‘+’ and ‘x’ indicate firms which only had one CAR estimate, in the former case for the respective
2005 event, in the latter for 2004.
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Figure 3: CAR for Constant Mean Models
Notes: The event analysis in the upper panel adopts a 50-day estimation window (minimum number of observations: 30) while
the lower panel adopts a 70-day one (minimum observations: 50). Within each plot the series markers indicate statistically
insignificant (hollow marker) and significant (filled marker) CARτ where we adopt a 5% level of significance. The CAR in Table
1 below report the estimates at t+ 5.
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Table 1: Cumulative Abnormal Return Estimates (Mean, Market Models)
Date Event Mean Return Model Market Return Model
CAR[-5,+5] abs SE CAR[-5,+5] abs SE
June 25 2002 Amendment restricting
patentability
-0.0227 [0.0194] -0.0226 [0.0193]
December 27 2004 Ordinance broadening
patentability
0.1371 [0.0272]∗∗∗ 0.1429 [0.0279]∗∗∗
April 5 2005 Amendment undoing or-
dinance
0.1048 [0.0201]∗∗∗ 0.1067 [0.0201]∗∗∗
June 20 2005 Revised guidelines -0.1029 [0.0212]∗∗∗ -0.1320 [0.0219]∗∗∗
Notes: The market return model estimation adopts the BSE Index; results for alternative indices are qualitatively identical. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 2: Which firms where most affected by the policy changes?
April 2005 & June 2005 vs December 2004
April 2005 vs December 2004 June 2005 vs December 2004
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Idrop Idrop ∆CAR ∆CAR Idrop Idrop ∆CAR ∆CAR
ln Sales -0.057 -0.072 0.045 0.056 -0.038 -0.035 0.058 0.060
[0.027]** [0.023]*** [0.016]*** [0.015]*** [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]** [0.025]**
Firm Age -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002
[0.011] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.012] [0.006] [0.007]
Service Share -0.054 -0.043 0.164 0.154 0.151 0.142 -0.013 -0.014
[0.147] [0.138] [0.092]* [0.089]* [0.142] [0.142] [0.120] [0.120]
IR&D -0.254 -0.165 0.214 0.202 -0.213 -0.169 0.038 0.038
[0.351] [0.347] [0.350] [0.373] [0.278] [0.276] [0.184] [0.184]
IPatents 0.288 -0.006 0.133 -0.076
[0.209] [0.146] [0.159] [0.104]∑
US patents 0.003 0.003 -0.017 0.001
[0.022] [0.019] [0.035] [0.013]∑
Indian patents 0.051 -0.018 0.019 -0.013
[0.014]*** [0.008]** [0.023] [0.008]*
Constant 0.740 0.743 -0.338 -0.360 0.62 0.639 -0.473 -0.484
[0.257]*** [0.255]*** [0.147]** [0.155]** [0.219]*** [0.219]*** [0.195]** [0.198]**
Number of firms 91 91 91 91 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.21
Notes: The sample of firms analysed (n = 91) in columns [1]-[4] includes all those with CAR for both events and is identical to that for the blue and red arrows in the
upper plot of Figure 4. The sample of firms analysed (n = 104) in columns [5-8] includes all those with CAR for both events and is identical to that for the blue and red
arrows in the lower plot of Figure 4. The dependent variable in the LPM regressions in [1], [2], [5] and [6] is a dummy for those firms for which their CAR at t + 5
following the 2005 event (April in [1] and [2], June in [5] and [6]) was smaller than that t+ 5 following the December 2004 event. In the OLS regressions in [3], [4], [7] and
[8] the dependent variable is the magnitude of difference between these two CARs (both times 2005 less 2004): large positive (negative) values indicate a significant increase
(decrease) in CAR. Some of the variables are indicators for very small groups: firms which carry out some R&D (n = 6 & n = 7 firms), which have some patent(s)
(n = 8 & n = 10 for [5]-[8] and [1]-[4] respectively), which have U.S. patents (n = 3 & n = 4), and which have Indian patents (n = 7 & n = 9). Each model
includes also dummies for missing observations related to sales (n = 3 & n = 4 missing), firm age (n = 5) and services share (n = 7). We indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using *, ** and *** respectively.
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Figure 4: CARt+5 by firm, comparing 2004 and 2005 events
Notes: The two graphs compare the firm-specific CARs for the broadening of patentability in December 2004 and its subsequent
undoing in April 2005 (event 2005a) – upper plot – as well as the CARs for the 2004 event and the revised guidelines in June 2005
(event 2005b). Firms are ordered by id along the x-axis – this merely acts to provide a visual ranking of the firms. The red and
blue arrows indicate the difference in firm-specific CAR 5 days after the respective event: for red (blue) arrows firm-specific CAR
in 2005 (2004) exceeds that in 2004 (2005). Two symbols indicate firms where one or the other CAR is missing: ‘+’ are values for
the respective 2005 event (i.e. 2004 is missing), ‘x’ are values for 2004 (i.e. 2005 event observation is missing). The horizontal
lines indicate average sample CAR for event 2005a and 2005b in the upper and lower panel, respectively.
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and innovation-related information (R&D expenditure dummy, patent dummy, separate patent
counts for USPTO and the IPO). Since the various events occur within less than six months
and our dependent variables are akin to time differences we only use the 2004 information on
firm characteristics in these regressions.7 Table 2 presents our results (for the corresponding
descriptive statistics see Table A-2 in the online appendix): columns [1], [2], [5], and [6] adopt
a linear probability model (LPM) to predict the Idrop dummy,
8 columns [3], [4], [7], and [8]
estimate a least squares model for the ‘∆CAR’ variable (these models equate to predicting the
length and signs of all arrows in Figure 4).
Our regressions9 indicate that larger firms (in terms of sales volume) ceteris paribus were
less significantly affected by the two events tightening patentability. The coefficients on sales
are also negative in columns [5] and [6] (the drop in CAR between the December 2004 and June
2005 events) but not statistically significantly different from zero. Firm age or services share10
are not consistently correlated with a drop in CAR or the change in CAR. The coefficients on
patent filings at the IPO suggest companies that filed for patents before the 2004-2005 sequence
of policy shocks were more likely to see a drop in market returns when the ordinance was
undone and when the revised guidelines were issued.
5 Conclusion
We study the effect of unanticipated proposed changes in the patent law and regulations that
affected the patentability of software on all publicly listed software companies in India. Our
analysis of market returns shows some clear patterns highlighting the positive market response
to a softening of patenting restrictions in December 2004 and a negative response once these
restrictions were reinforced in June 2005. We further showed that the market indicated a het-
erogeneous response to the former event, which explains the counter-intuitive positive average
market response to the undoing of the ordinance in April 2004. That is, companies that did
not experience positive returns when the ordinance was announced experienced positive returns
when it was undone. In contrast, the negative effect of the tightening of patenting restrictions
through the revised guidelines on those software companies that had experienced positive re-
turns when the ordinance was announced drowned out the more modest positive reaction by the
other companies. Investigation of the characteristics of firms reveals that comparatively smaller
software companies were most adversely affected by the tightening of patentability.
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Online Appendix — not intended for publication
A Firm-level and Patent Data
For international patent filings with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) we rely on
EPO’s PATSTAT database. We extract data on patent filings from PATSTAT patents filed by
Indian residents at the USPTO. While the USPTO data can be expected to be complete, there
is serious under-reporting in PATSTAT of Indian domestic patent filings with the Indian Patent
Office (IPO). We therefore rely instead on three other databases. The electronic patent search
facility available on IPO’s website iPairs provides information on published patents only from
2005 onwards.11 For patent filings before 2005, we rely on the EKASWA database assembled
by the Patent Facilitating Centre (PFC) of the Indian Department of Science and Technology.
EKASWA contains all domestic patents published between January 1995 and early 2005.12 In
addition, we complement the official data sources using the online portal BigPatents India.
The U.S. and Indian patent data are matched to the firm-level PROWESS database provided
by the Center for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE). We focus on all software com-
panies listed in India – both on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock
Exchange (NSE); a total of 294 software companies. For each firm in our dataset, we obtain
detailed information on accounting balance sheets, financial statements, industry information,
and share prices.
Due to the absence of a unique identifier shared by the firm-level and patent data, the main
problem in constructing our dataset consists in matching patents to firms. To match assignee
names to company names, we rely on a combination of an automated matching algorithm and
extensive manual checking of the (un)matched data.
B Event Study Methdology
We use an event study approach looking at changes in companies’ market valuation, which
acts as a proxy for firm performance. The objective is to distinguish market reactions due to
normal factors from reactions induced by the policy shocks. To do this, we specify a market
model (‘normal returns’) and estimate deviations (‘abnormal returns’) from such a model over
the event window. To illustrate, consider the event timeline in Figure A-1 where τ is the event
date (policy shock):
Figure A-1: Event timeline
- T
T0 T1 T3T2τ
Estimation Event Post-Event
The market model specifies the relationship between the period t return on security i (rit)
and the period t return on the market portfolio (rmt ):
11The search facility also provides information on granted patents before 2005. This, however, misses any patent
that was not granted. Given our research objective, we are interested in any patent filing independently of whether it
was eventually granted.
12The data in EKASWA come from the Patent Office Gazette, which was published only in print format. The
Gazette was replaced in 2005 by the Patent Journal, which is published both in print and electronic formats.
i
rit = α+ βr
m
t + it (1)
We estimate this market model in the estimation window (T0 − T1) prior to the event τ to
obtain estimates for α, β. Using these estimated parameters we predict expected return rˆpit in
the event window (T1 − T2), from which in turn we can then compute the deviation from the
observed return, thus providing a measure of ‘abnormal returns’ (ˆit):
ˆit = rit − rˆpit rˆpit = αˆ+ βˆrmt (2)
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the event window is then simply the accumu-
lated ˆit from T1 to T2:
CARit =
T2∑
τ=T1
ˆit (3)
If the event had no effect on our subset of firms then ˆit should have mean 0. If the policy
change had a positive effect then we observe abnormal returns, ˆit > 0 which produce an upward
sloping CAR. The underlying assumption is that without the event or singular information, the
relation between a firm’s asset return and the market return is stable. We present our results as
average CAR estimates across all software firms, reporting the outcome at t + 5 days as well
as (in graphical form) for days t − 5 to t + 5: while the latter will indicate any response to the
specific event, the former will concentrate on the likely permanence of the impact. Note also that
we specify a pre-event window from t−80 to t−10 days, which provides substantial time series
observations to estimate the expected returns for firm i while at the same time preventing any
overlap between pre-event window for event τ and the event window for event τ − 1. The event
window encompasses the 11 days from t− 5 to t+ 5. Both of these choices are fairly standard
in the literature and we verified that reasonable changes to these window sizes do not affect our
results in any significant manner. Finally, we also investigate a number of alternatives for the
market model outlined above: firstly, we analyze a simpler ‘constant mean return’ model, where
the abnormal returns are computed for firm i without accounting for the return on the market
portfolio, i.e. rmt is dropped from equation (1). Secondly, in the standard ‘market return model’
we investigate a number of alternative indices for market return, namely the BSE Sensex, the
CMIE Index for IT, the BSE Tech Index and the CNX IT Sector Index of the National Stock
Exchange of India. All additional results are available on request.
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C Additional Figures
Figure A-2: Legal status of patent filings at the Indian Patent Office – 2000-2007
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Notes: The legal status was obtained from the iPairs website of the Indian Patent Office in February 2014.
Figure A-3: Legal status of patent filings at the USPTO – 2000-2007
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Notes: The legal status was obtained from the PAIR website of the USPTO in February 2014.
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D Additional Tables
Table A-1: DID Estimates
Daily Data Pre-Post Data
2004 2005a 2005b 2004 2005a 2005b
Post -0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post × Treat 0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.005∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 28,999 25,882 31,606 324 328 332
Notes: * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The table reports difference-in-difference estimation results for a sample of 166 firms over a time
interval of -150 and +150 days following an event. The ‘treatment’ group of firms is defined as all companies that had applied for at least 1 patent before the
first event in 2004 (ordinance). The results are split by using all company-time observations of returns (Daily Data) and collapsing returns into a pre and post
period (Pre-Post Data). The variable Post indicates the time period equal to and after the various announcements were made (in columns); 2004 refers to the
ordinance broadening patentability, 2005a refers to the amendment undoing ordinance, 2005b refers to the revised guidelines. The variable Treat, refers to
companies that are patent active i.e, those that have applied for at least one patent, before 2004. All standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for clustering at the
company level, i.e, the level at which treatment varies and are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation across time (for the daily data).
Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics for Regression sample in Table 2
Panel A: April 2005 vs December 2004 Panel B: June 2005 vs December 2004
variable N mean median sd min max N mean median sd min max
Idrop 91 0.42 0 0 1 104 0.63 1 0 1
∆CAR 91 0.03 0.04 0.37 -0.89 1.09 104 -0.18 -0.12 0.41 -1.93 0.51
ln Sales 91 5.16 5.18 2.48 0 11.63 104 5.17 5.16 2.62 0 11.63
Firm Age 91 14.33 14.00 6.05 0 30 104 14.38 14.00 6.00 0 30
Service share 91 0.74 1.00 0.42 0 1 104 0.76 1.00 0.42 0 1
IR&D 91 0.04 0 0 1 104 0.05 0 0 1
IPatents 91 0.13 0 0 1 104 0.15 0 0 1∑
US patents 91 0.38 0 2.05 0 13 104 0.39 0 1.958 0 13∑
US patents 91 0.71 0 3.31 0 27 104 0.79 0 3.404 0 27
Missing sales 91 0.04 0 0 1 104 0.05 0 0 1
Missing age 91 0.05 0 0 1 104 0.05 0 0 1
Missing Service share 91 0.08 0 0 1 104 0.07 0 0 1
Notes: The sample of firms analysed (n = 91) in Panel A includes all those with CAR for both events and is identical to that for the blue and red arrows in the upper plot of
Figure 4 in the main text. The sample of firms analysed (n = 104) in Panel B includes all those with CAR for both events and is identical to that for the blue and red arrows
in the lower plot of the aforementioned Figure. The dependent variables in the LPM regressions of table X are (i) a dummy for those firms for which their CAR at t + 5
following the 2005 event was smaller than that t + 5 following the December 2004 event: Idrop; and (ii) the magnitude of difference between these two CARs (both times
2005 less 2004), ∆CAR: large positive (negative) values indicate a significant increase (decrease) in CAR. As is customary we do not report standard deviations for
dummy variables.
iv
Table A-3: Which firms where most affected by the policy changes?
April 2005 & June 2005 vs December 2004
April 2005 vs December 2004 June 2005 vs December 2004
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Idrop Idrop ∆CAR ∆CAR Idrop Idrop ∆CAR ∆CAR
ln Sales -0.057 -0.072 0.045 0.056 -0.038 -0.035 0.058 0.060
[0.027]** [0.022]*** [0.018]*** [0.014]*** [0.023]* [0.025] [0.029]** [0.023]***
Firm Age -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002
[0.015] [0.013] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013] [0.012] [0.007] [0.008]
Service Share -0.054 -0.043 0.164 0.154 0.151 0.142 -0.013 -0.014
[0.147] [0.153] [0.106] [0.103] [0.176] [0.151] [0.121] [0.130]
IR&D -0.254 -0.165 0.214 0.202 -0.213 -0.169 0.038 0.038
[0.489] [0.470] [0.374] [0.499] [0.360] [0.380] [0.178] [0.226]
IPatents 0.288 -0.006 0.133 -0.076
[0.266] [0.158] [0.169] [0.098]∑
US patents 0.003 0.003 -0.017 0.001
[0.167] [0.070] [0.104] [0.031]∑
Indian patents 0.051 -0.018 0.019 -0.013
[0.055] [0.040] [0.044] [0.019]
Constant 0.740 0.743 -0.338 -0.360 0.62 0.639 -0.473 -0.484
[0.291]*** [0.334]** [0.154]** [0.189]* [0.273]** [0.237]*** [0.225]** [0.185]***
Number of firms 91 91 91 91 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.21
Notes: The sample of firms analysed (n = 91) in columns [1]-[4] includes all those with CAR for both events and is identical to that for the blue and red arrows in the
upper plot of Figure 4. The sample of firms analysed (n = 104) in columns [5-8] includes all those with CAR for both events and is identical to that for the blue and red
arrows in the lower plot of Figure 4. The dependent variable in the LPM regressions in [1], [2], [5] and [6] is a dummy for those firms for which their CAR at t + 5
following the 2005 event (April in [1] and [2], June in [5] and [6]) was smaller than that t+ 5 following the December 2004 event. In the OLS regressions in [3], [4], [7] and
[8] the dependent variable is the magnitude of difference between these two CARs (both times 2005 less 2004): large positive (negative) values indicate a significant increase
(decrease) in CAR. Some of the variables are indicators for very small groups: firms which carry out some R&D (n = 6 & n = 7 firms), which have some patent(s)
(n = 8 & n = 10 for [5]-[8] and [1]-[4] respectively), which have U.S. patents (n = 3 & n = 4), and which have Indian patents (n = 7 & n = 9). Each model
includes also dummies for missing observations related to sales (n = 3 & n = 4 missing), firm age (n = 5) and services share (n = 7). We indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level using *, ** and *** respectively. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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